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Abstract 
 
In this paper, we take an incomplete contract approach to Eurozone Fiscal Governance between the 
European Commission (EC) and any heavily debt member state, Greece in particular. Incomplete 
contract approach makes possible to put a long process of Eurozone Fiscal Governance into an 
extensive form game in which a renegotiation procedure is incorporated. We theoretically reveal the 
conflict of interests between the EC (Germany) and Greece over the Greek debt repayment plan 
proposed in 2015. We show that the Greek’s position is consistent with incomplete contract theory, 
but that the EC (Germany) does not allow the renegotiation for restructuring for growth-oriented 
debt repayment program proposed by the Greek government because the EC (Germany) judges that 
the commitment effect (on fiscal austerity) is greater than the flexibility one (pro-growth effect). 
This will undoubtedly provide a novel and interesting approach to Eurozone Fiscal Governance. 
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ⅠIntroduction 
 
This paper takes an incomplete contract approach (more specifically, à la Grossman and Hart 
(1986), Hart and Moore (1988), and Aghion, Dewatripont, and Ray (1994), which focus on optimal 
incomplete contracts over hold-up problem) to Eurozone Fiscal Governance between the European 
Commission (EC) and an agent (any heavily debt member state, Greece in particular.) 1 
Incomplete contract approach to Eurozone Fiscal Governance makes possible to analyze it as one 
coherent whole process of governance from an initial contract, state’s realization, renegotiations for 
setting a new contract, to payoffs realization and its division. 
We apply and extend Suzuki (1998)’s model of renegotiations in incomplete contract game to 
Eurozone Fiscal Governance between the European Commission (EC) and an agent (e.g., Greece). 
Though Suzuki (1998)’s analytical setting is that a car-part supplier and a car-assembler engage in 
renegotiations over part’s quality and new price for it, the European Commission and Greece 
similarly engage in renegotiation over their burden sharing in the latter’s deficit reduction, and their 
renegotiation process has essentially the same property as Suzuki(1998)’s procurement setting.  
Our paper indeed makes possible to put a long process of fiscal governance in Eurozone between 
the European Commission (EC) and an excessively deficit country (an agent) into an extensive form 
game in which a renegotiation procedure is incorporated. It enables us to identify how to divide 
surplus from economic growth between EC and the agent in a state-contingent way, that is, in the 
Bad State and in the Good State. 
Using our incomplete contract approach, we reveal the real conflicts of interest between the EC 
(Germany) and Greece over the Greek debt repayment plan proposed in 2015. A. Tsipras, Greek’s prime 
minister, and Y. Varoufakis, Greek finance minister, proposed for swapping the existing debt from the 
international lenders including the EC for GDP-growth-indexed Greek bonds. The Greek government 
tries to leave the existing bail-out framework for Greece and wants to leave its austerity program worked 
                                                 
1 Incomplete contract approach has become a rigorous and widely used approach in dealing with various 
issues, including firm theory, international trade, scope of government, corporate finance, and political 
economy. Our paper deals with the most up-to-date international political economy bargaining problem 
between Supra- national authority (European Commission) and Sovereignty (Greece in particular) in an 
incomplete contract model. See Hart (1995) for an introduction into the research of incomplete contract, and 
Bolton and Dewatripint (2005) for an exhaustive explanation. For the arguments on the sources for contractual 
incompleteness, 1) Enforcement Costs, 2) Unforeseen contingencies, 3) Writing Costs, see, Tirole (1999). 
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out between the preceding Greek government and the international lenders. That is, the Greek 
government wants to leave its austerity-oriented debt repayment program for some growth-oriented one. 
In our paper, we derive the “After-renegotiation debt repayment planⅠ” , which can create a certain 
degree of growth incentive and corresponds to the plan proposed by the Greek government in 2015. The 
Greek’s position is consistent with incomplete contract theory. 
Then, why does not the EC (Germany in particular) allow the renegotiation for restructuring for 
growth-oriented debt repayment program? The EC (Germany) judges that the commitment effect is 
greater than the flexibility one. 
In particular, once the renegotiation for reducing national debt were permitted for the Greece, other 
PIIGS countries such as Portugal, Spain, Italy would also expect that the similar renegotiation for debt 
reduction were allowed for them, and require the EC to do so strongly. The EC could not help accepting 
the renegotiation offers by such countries. But, they would in turn lose incentives to achieve higher GDP 
through structural reforms of their economies. This decrease in GDP is essentially the ex-ante inefficiency 
generated by the ex-post renegotiation, which Jean Tirole, 2014 Nobel Prize Economist, has emphasized. 
This argument just implies the trade-off between Commitment and Flexibility. By “Commitment”, the 
EC (substantially, Germany) can prevent the moral hazard, and soft budget problem by other PIIGS 
countries by committing to imposing the fiscal austerity on Greece. By “Flexibility”, the EC can induce a 
positive growth incentive from Greece, by proposing the GDP-growth-indexed bonds through debt 
restructuring, while it may incur the moral hazard, and soft budget problem by other PIIGS countries by 
losing the reputation for the EC to commit not to renegotiate for bailing out. Taking this trade-off into 
account, the EC (or Germany) tries to keep the existing bail-out framework for Greece and its austerity 
program, when the commitment effect is greater than the flexibility one. 
 
Ⅱ A Framework of Incomplete Contract  
 
1. Two-player model 
We construct an incomplete contract model to analyze the Eurozone fiscal governance, where the players 
are the European Commission (EC) and an agent (any heavily debt member state, Greece in particular).  
 
2. Timing 
t =1: The EC makes a take-it-or-leave-it debt contract offer, D , to the agent (a heavily debt member state, 
e.g. Greece). Agent either accepts or rejects. Agent’s national debt level D is determined. 
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t = 2: Agent’s (mid-term) GDPQ is realized. 
t = 3: Given D  andQ , the EC and the agent “renegotiate over the terms of the initial contract and 
decide the terms of the final contract.” 
t = 4: Agent chooses an investment level { }0,i I∈ , whether to make a reform ( i I= ) or not ( 0i = ). 
t = 5: Final GDP is realized and Payoffs are distributed among the players (the EC and the agent). 
 
We formulate that Final GDP output is 0Q S if i I+ = >   (1) 
, where S is the value added arising from the agent’s (Greece) economic reform (investment) i I= .  
  We next discuss our assumption that the initial contract signed at t=1 is very simple, specifying 
only the agent’s national debt level D . The future investment decision { }0,i I∈ and the midterm and 
final output levels ( ,Q Q S+ ) are not included in this initial debt contract. In many ways this 
“incomplete contract” assumption is quite sensible in our international context. Future decision 
{ }0,i I∈ on an economic reform is very difficult to describe and enforce, and similarly it will be 
very hard to verify the GDP output levels ex post and so write and commit the players to the 
state-contingent “complete” national debt contract ( )D Q ex ante. 
Note that during final adjustment of terms and conditions at t = 3, the national debt D determined at 
t = 1 is not unilaterally cancelled but, rather, is restructured based on an agreement by both parties. If the 
two parties are unable to reach the formal agreement regarding terms and conditions, negotiations break 
down. The disagreement point (TA, TEC) is the value player can expect to receive at the threat point 
(equilibrium point when negotiations break down).  
An overall picture of the model can be gained by creating a timeline of the game.  
 
Initial Contract Agent       Renegotiation of       Agent             Final GDP 
Signed Output       National Debt Investment { }0,i I∈     Payoffs 
 
National Debt D    mid-termＧＤＰ Breach or Revision   
  GDPQ            Final Contract   
 ｔ＝1 ｔ＝2          ｔ＝3            ｔ＝4              ｔ＝5 
 
        Figure 1 
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Ⅲ The Commitment Regime that leaves room for Ex-post Renegotiation 
 
(1)   If  ,Q S D+ <  Bad State, where 0i =  is the credible threat. 
(2)  If  ,Q S D+ ≥  Good State, where 0i =  is the empty threat.  
In the Bad State case (1), whereQ S D+ < , an equilibrium (rules revision) is reached wherein the 
agent enacts reforms I based on an agreement to restructure the national debt D and the making of a new 
national debt contract. The new debt plan ( )*D Q when the two parties reach an agreement to 
restructure the debt is solved via the following Nash bargaining solution: 
( ) ( ) ( )1* *, arg max g gA EC A A EC ECU U U T U T −= − −  
               { },A ECU U  
subject to A ECU U Q S+ = +   
This solution attempts to maximize the product of the two excess utilities (i.e. the Nash Product) from the 
threat point ( ),A ECT T between the EU member state (Greece etc.) and the EC on the negotiation 
(Pareto) frontier A ECU U Q S+ = + .  
The solution ( )*A A A ECU T g Q S T T= + + − − and ( )( )* 1EC EC A ECU T g Q S T T= + − + − −  
gives the rent distribution for Total Output (Final GDP) Q S+  after restructuring. 
Total Output Q S+  is shared by EU member state A and the EC such that 
Payoff after renegotiation=Threat point payoff+ Surplus generated from renegotiation g ×｛ ｝ 
                  Bargaining power（e.g. 1 2g = ）                                                                     
     ＥＣpayoff                                          Figure 2 
                         Case (2)     Case (1) 
                                       
 
The region (bold line) on the 
bargaining (Pareto) frontier, where 
both parties have an incentive for 
reaching an agreement. 
A payoff distribution in this region 
is reached during renegotiation 
•   
          Ａpayoff at the breakdown 
                   Status quo（Threat point, Outside Option）Ａpayoff 
Q S+  
ＥＣ threat point payoff 
ECT  at the bargaining 
breakdown   
AT  
Q S+  
D  D  
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Figure 3: Nash Bargaining Solution                      
    ＥＣpayoff            Nash Product ( ) ( )1g gA A EC ECU T U T
−− −   
 
                         Nash Bargaining Solution2 
                           
                          
                          
Bargaining Payoff           ●                            
  
     •   
          Threat PointPayoff for A 
            AT  Bargaining Payoff                 Ａ payoff     
Status Quo（Threat Point, Outside Option） 
 
Figure 3 shows at which point state A and EC agree over division of surplus. It is the point where the 
Nash Product touches the thickened line on the bargaining frontier. By reading the pair on the graph 
(Figure 3), we can know A’s payoff. It can also be calculated by solving the first order condition for the 
Nash bargaining solution. That is,  
( ) ( )* 1A A A EC A ECU T g Q S T T gQ gS g T gT= + + − − = + + − −    
 
In the Good State case (2), whereQ S D+ ≥ , the EC does not have an incentive to accept the agent’s 
(Greece) request for debt restructuring (debt reduction and exemption). This is because the threat that the 
agent “will not be able to repay its existing debt D  (i.e. that it will default) unless this existent debt is 
restructured or reduced, even if he enacts structural reform i I= and increases output S beyond the 
current GDP levelQ ” is an empty threat. In other words, the debt D can be repaid under the original 
contracted agreement so long as structural reform is enacted and output is increased. In Figure A2 in the 
Appendix, this scenario corresponds to the subgame that occurs when the agent submits a request to 
restructure its existing debt, and it is rejected by the EC. It can be seen that, if the agent implements 
                                                 
2 The Nash Bargaining Solution locates at the point which makes the Nash product, the product of the increase 
in each player’s payoff by agreeing from his/her threat point payoff, largest on the bargaining (Pareto) frontier. 
Threat Point Payoff 
forＥＣ ECT   
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investment I, repayment of the debt is possible whereby the payoff is Q S D+ −  > 0. In this scenario, 
an equilibrium is reached wherein the agent (EU member) does not submit a request for debt restructuring 
and a final agreement is reached (agreement compliance) through negotiations under the existing rules, 
and the investment is carried out. The agent’s equilibrium rent becomesQ S D+ − in this regime.  
Remark: Based on the above argument, the extensive form for the renegotiation game in the Bad 
State ( )Q S D+ < and the Good State ( )Q S D+ ≥  can be shown as in Appendix.  
 
Ⅳ Equilibrium rents for Agent 
 
   From an analysis in cases (1) and (2) above,, the equilibrium rents for two types of the different  
agents (for example, Greece in Bad State of Case (1) and Germany in Good State of Case (2) ) can 
be obtained. Their equilibrium rents can be shown as a function of GDP Q below: 
 
 
 
Presented in graph-form, the equilibrium rent function that allows renegotiation is as follows. 
Each type of the renegotiation-proof equilibrium rent can be shown in Figure 4-1 and Figure 4-2 below:  
Figure 4-(1): Renegotiation-proof equilibrium rent functions  
 
Figure 4-(1) 
 
 
 
                         ○ 
 
 
( )1 A ECgS g T gT+ − −    
 
                               
                ０    (the Bad State)   D S−     (the Good State)     Q  
 
( ) ( )
( )
* 1 the Bad State  
the Good State
A EC
A
gQ gS g T gT Q D Sif
U
Q D SifQ S D
 + + − − < −   =  ≥ −+ −
 
１ 
Q S D+ −  
( )1 A ECgQ gS g T gT+ + − −    
１ 1g <  
*
AU  
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The Figure 4-(1) shows that if the mid-term GDP level Q  exceeds the threshold D S− , that is, 
in the Good State, the agent can obtain 100% bargaining power 1g =  or control power over any 
additional surplus Q S D+ −  after paying back the constant initial debt level D. That is, the agent 
becomes a 100% marginal residual claimant. On the other hand, if the GDP level Q  falls even 
slightly below the threshold D S- , that is, in the Bad State, the agent’s bargaining power is 
substantially reduced from 1g = , and the agent can only obtain the ratio 1g <  of the surplus created 
from the GDP Q  through the renegotiation (Nash Bargaining) over revision of the initial contract, 
as the term g Q⋅ shows. That is, the agent is no longer a 100% marginal residual claimant. 
Taking into consideration by backward induction its “renegotiation-proof rent function”, an each nation 
makes its endogenous choice of its GDP levelQ . It depends on each country’s GDP cost function3, and 
generates an efficient German equilibrium *GERQ and an inefficient Greek equilibrium
*
GRQ in which 
national debt is reduced and financial assistance is received as a result of ex-post renegotiations. 
 
                                                                         Figure 4-(2) 
*
AU  
                                   Case 2 
                                                                   Germany Equilibrium 
•  
 
 
                   Case1  
                  Greek Equilibrium 
•  
( )1 A ECgS g T gT+ − −                                       
 
                               
               ０   *GRQ    D S−                    
*
GERQ   Q  
                                                 
3 GDP cost functions correspond to two kinds of positively-sloped curves in the Figure 4-(2), where 
Greece has a steeper curve, while Germany has a much gentler curve. The difference reflects their cost 
difference (competitiveness) in increasing GDP. 
１ 
Q S D+ −  
( )1 A ECgQ gS g T gT+ + − −    
1g <  
  
9 
 
[Proposition 1] “After-renegotiation debt repayment plan” in the commitment regime that leave 
room for ex-post renegotiation [I] 
In cases where the Nash Bargaining Solution is employed as the renegotiation process, the 
equilibrium result is i I= for allQ , and the after-renegotiation debt ( )*D Q is given by: 
(1) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )* 1 1 1 A ECD Q g Q g S g T gT= − + − − − +    if Q S D+ <  (the Bad State) 
(2) ( )*D Q D=  (the initial debt level)  if Q S+ ＞D  (the Good State) 
      
Explanation: Based on the previous figure, when Q S+ ＜D , ( )* *AU Q S D Q= + − . Therefore,   
( ) ( )( )* * * 1A EC EC A ECD Q Q S U U T g Q S T T= + − = = + − + − −
( ) ( ) ( )1 1 1 A ECg Q g S g T gT= − + − − − +  
In this case, structural reform (investment i I= ) is carried out for all levels of mid-term GDPQ , (while 
the principal accepts restructuring the agent’s debt). In other words, default is avoided through the 
restructuring of national debt, and Efficiency deriving from this surpasses efficiency deriving from 
“committing to the existing debt obligation.” Under such a regime, the “After-renegotiation debt 
repayment plan” can be shown in the figure 5[I]. 
 
                                                           Figure5 [I] 
( )*D Q  
      Initial level D              ● 
 
 
                                                       Restructuring of National Debt  
                         ○   through Renegotiation  
 
 
( ) ( )1 1 A ECg S g T gT− − − +  
                               
            ０       Bad States     D S−             Q   
( ) ( ) ( )1 1 1 A ECg Q g S g T gT− + − − − +    
１1 g−  
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Ⅴ Alternative bargaining game formulation 
In the case above, the Nash Bargaining Solution was applied in the restructuring of terms and conditions 
of the initial contract. There is another form of bargaining game for it, too. It is an “ultimatum game“, 
where the EC makes a “take-it-or-leave-it” offer to the agent. Then, the equilibrium outcome 
(after-renegotiation debt repayment plan) is as follows: 
 
[Proposition 2] “After-renegotiation debt repayment plan” in the commitment regime that leave 
room for ex-post renegotiation [II] 
In a bargaining game in which the EC makes a “take-it-or-leave-it” offer to the agent, the equilibrium 
result is i I= for allQ , and the after- renegotiation debt ( )*D Q  is given by: 
(1) ( )*D Q Q S= +  if Q S D+ <  (the Bad State), 
(2) ( )*D Q D=  if Q S D+ ≥  (the Good State). 
 
Thus, we have the“after-renegotiation debt repayment plan” in the commitment regime with ex-post 
renegotiation (the “Ultimatum game” case) as the red kinked line ( )*D Q in the below figure, and then 
the renegotiation-proof equilibrium rent function for the agent is the blue kinked line *AU . 
 
                                Fiscal austerity program and Rent function Figure5 [II] 
*
AU  
 
                    
 
                          
 
 
 
 
                               
            ０          D S−             Q  
     Implication: Greece’s rent * 0AU = for this range Q D S≤ −  due to fiscal austerity program 
１ 
*
AU Q S D= + −  
( )* * 0AU Q S D Q= + − =  
( )*D Q Q S= +  
D  
S   
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Ⅵ Interpretations of the Greek debt repayment plan proposed in 2015 
 
   A. Tsipras, Greek prime minister, and Y. Varoufakis, Greek finance minister, proposed for 
swapping the existing debt from the international lenders including the EC for GDP-growth-indexed 
Greek bonds. The Greek government tries to leave the existing bail-out framework for Greece and 
wants to leave its austerity program worked out between the preceding Greek government and the 
international lenders. By emphasizing growth over austerity measures, the Greek government wants 
to leave its austerity-oriented debt repayment program, which corresponds to the red line in Figure 
5[II], for some growth-oriented one. The plan proposed by the Greek government corresponds to the 
“After-renegotiation debt repayment plan” shown in Figure 5[I], which can create a certain degree 
of growth incentive * 0GRQ > , as Figure 4-(2) shows. 
 
Ⅶ  The incentive for the EC (Germany in particular) not to allow the renegotiation for 
restructuring for growth-oriented debt repayment program, i.e. the debt restructuring from Figure 
5[II] to Figure 5[I] 
 
Once the renegotiation for reducing national debt were permitted for the Greece, other PIIGS 
countries such as Portugal, Spain, Italy would also expect that the similar renegotiation for debt 
reduction were allowed for them, and require the EC to do so strongly. Then, the EC could not help 
accepting the renegotiation offer by such countries. However, they would in turn lose incentives to 
achieve higher GDP *SPAQ in the Figure 6, and only try to achieve ( )**SPAQ D S ε= − − in the Figure 6, 
which is the optimal GDP level when faced with the“renegotiation-proof equilibrium rent function” 
for the Bad states Q D S< − in Figure 5[I]. This decrease in GDP * **SPA SPAQ Q→  in the Figure 6 is 
essentially “the ex-ante inefficiency generated by the ex-post renegotiation”, which Jean Tirole, 2014 
Nobel Prize Economist, has emphasized.  
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                                           Figure 6 
*
AU  
                                   Case 2 
Germany Equilibrium 
•  
 
                                    ●Spain/Italy  
Overturned by Renegotiation    Equilibrium      
                     Case1  
                             Greek Equilibrium 
•  
( )1 A ECgS g T gT+ − −                                       
                               
               ０     *GRQ               
*
SPAQ    
*
GERQ   Q  
 ( )**SPAQ D S ε= − −  
 
Commitment vs. Flexibility 
 
The argument so far, as a whole, implies the trade-off between Commitment and Flexibility. By 
“Commitment”, it means that the EC (substantially, Germany) can prevent the moral hazard, soft 
budget incentive problem by other PIIGS countries by committing to imposing the fiscal austerity on 
Greece. This will generate GDP levels * 0GRQ  and
*
SPAQ . By “Flexibility”, it means that the EC can 
induce a growth incentive * 0GRQ >  from the Greece, by proposing the GDP-growth-indexed bonds 
through debt restructuring, while it may bring about the moral hazard, soft budget problem by other 
PIIGS countries by losing the reputation for the EC to commit not to renegotiate for bail out. This 
will generate GDP levels * 0GRQ > and
** *
SPA SPAQ Q . Taking this trade-off into account, the EC (or 
Germany) tries to keep the existing bail-out framework for Greece and its austerity program, when the 
commitment effect is greater than the flexibility one. 
 
 
１ 
Q S D+ −  
( )1 A ECgQ gS g T gT+ + − −    
1g <  
  
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Ⅷ Assessment of Our Analysis 
 
Specifically, by setting the threshold point to be the dividing line of states into either solvency or 
insolvency, our model explains how decisively bargaining powers over control of surplus shifts 
between an agent (any heavily debt member state, Greece in particular) and the principal (the 
European Commission (EC)). Second, by focusing on how to provide an agent (heavily debt member 
state, e.g. Greece) in the Bad State with an incentive for necessary investment, the model shows the 
way to achieve ex-post efficiency. Third, by comparing the two commitment regimes with room for 
ex-post renegotiation, one via the NBS and the other via ultimatum offer, the model explains the 
trade-off between commitment and flexibility. Eurozone fiscal governance possesses all these three 
properties. The model well captures them.  
In more overall assessment, Eurozone fiscal governance has typical features of relation-specific 
investment and hold-up problem. Economic reforms any heavily debt country faces are required and 
specified by the creditor represented by the EC. The debtor signs a revised contract promising to 
implement the reforms in exchange for the credit. The credit is seriously sought after by the debtor 
as the last resort to avoid default. However, the reforms are also as much difficult to implement as to 
secure the credit. They are truly quid pro quo for the credit the debtor receives. The implementation 
of the reforms as required investment is the guarantee for debt repayment to the creditor. Out of 
surplus they produce, regular debt is payed back. Credit supply, implementation of the economic 
reforms, and debt repayment are inseparably interconnected. The economic reforms are thus very 
much like the relation-specific investment. In addition, the debtor has very limited markets on which 
it can put its progress in the economic reforms for alternative sources of credit. The IMF, the most 
probable source for credit, is already in the creditor group represented by the EC. If the debtor 
carries out the reforms, bonds markets will favorably respond to it and interest rates for bonds will 
fall. Bonds investors are, however, decentralized and anonymous. They can’t be parties for specific 
contracts for the debtor, taking away meaningful sources of incentive for investment away from the 
debtor.  
On the other hand, economic reforms face strong domestic opposition. Deregulation, liberalization, 
and privatization all clash with vested interests of strong interest groups and are extremely hard for 
any incumbent government to carry out without taking the risk of losing in coming elections. 
The two factors above lead the debtor to lose incentive for the reforms, causing the “hold-up 
problem”. We thus need to make an effective arrangement for incentive, enough to induce the debtor 
to fulfill the reforms. With the incomplete contract approach, we could shed a new light to this 
essential aspect in the Eurozone fiscal governance and its incentive problem. 
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